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Ecient growth often requires the integration of individuals from lower-performing
groups, rms, or societies into higher-performing ones. Such integration may be di-
cult without facilitating interventions or restrictions. We explore, using a laboratory
experiment, the eectiveness of two regularly-employed entry restrictions: entry quotas
and entry exams. We use a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria, in which
we allow an eciently-coordinated group and an ineciently-coordinated one to arise
endogenously. We then allow individuals to move from the low-performing group to the
high-performing one. We vary whether such movement is unrestricted, is limited to one
entrant per period, or is subject to passing an entry exam. We nd both kinds of restric-
tions improve the ecient integration of entrants, but that there is no additional benet
obtained by their combination. The restrictions lead to improved behavior among en-
trants, but they have a stronger inuence on the maintenance of good behavior among
incumbents in the high-performing group.
JEL Codes: C72, C92, M12
Key Words: Growth, Entry, Coordination, Experiments
1 Introduction
An important issue in the pursuit of large eciently-performing groups is how to incorporate
new entrants. For example, a growing economy might need to rely on immigration to provide
a suitable labor supply. Similarly, protable rms often expand by integrating individuals
through external hiring.
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1In most cases, the growing group is one that has previously performed well on some
important dimension, such as productivity or pro￿tability, leading to a desire to maintain
such high performance while undergoing growth. Incumbents in the growing entity have
a history of working well together, expecting high performance from one another, and
obtaining e¢ cient coordination of their actions. Conversely, entrants are often from lower-
performing entities, such as poorer nations or less pro￿table ￿rms, where expectations of
others￿behavior are lower and where the resulting behavior is either coordinated on less
e¢ cient equilibria, or perhaps not coordinated at all. This creates an important concern:
when incorporating entrants from low-peforming groups, how can growing entities maintain
the high performance that has made them successful? In order to grow successfully while
incorporating new entrants, it must be that both new entrants adapt their behavior to
the higher standards of the better-performing group and also that incumbents in the high-
performing group maintain the good behavior that has previously led to success.
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to explore two common policies for fa-
cilitating the successful entry of individuals from lower-performing groups into ones that
have historically performed more e¢ ciently. The ￿rst policy we examine is an entry exam,
whereby individuals are required to demonstrate knowledge or skills prior to being granted
entry. For example, countries set thresholds for granting entry to immigrants, such as suf-
￿ciently high professional or educational standing, or may implement naturalization exams
as a requirement for citizenship. A club may require entrants to demonstrate knowledge of
the club￿ s history prior to entry. Finally, many ￿rms use pre-employment testing as a way
of screening potential job applicants for desirable qualities. The second policy is an entry
quota, whereby the number of entrants in a given time period is regulated. For example, a
country may limit the number of immigrants that are allowed entry in a given year, as the
United States did with the 1924 Immigration Act. Similarly, a club may limit the number
of new members it accepts. Or a ￿rm may explicitly target a slow-growth strategy as a way
to maintain e¢ cient practices.
We focus on a production context in which there is high action interdependence ￿using
a ￿minimum-e⁄ort￿or ￿weak-link￿coordination game, in which e¢ ciency (output) is deter-
mined by the lowest input by any group member.1 Thus, in order to perform well, a group
needs all players to make high input choices. This makes it particularly di¢ cult to incor-
1While situations that exactly mirror this game ￿i.e., in which production is determined by the minimum
input ￿are rare, the game is a useful model for contexts in which the level of interdependence is su¢ ciently
high that output is sensitive to the actions of small numbers of individuals. The game has been applied
to study diverse contexts, such as ￿rm production (Brandts and Cooper, 2006), public goods provision
(Hirschleifer, 1983), and shared security (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003).
2porate new entrants since e¢ ciency can be harmed if either any entrant or any incumbent
selects lower input. Growth in such environments may also be particularly di¢ cult because
larger group sizes have a harder time obtaining e¢ cient coordination (see Van Huyck et al.,
1990; Weber 2006).
In a standard game of this sort there is some number N of players who each select
from an ordered set of strategies xi 2 (1;:::;K) and produce some collective output that is
an increasing function of the minimum choice among all the players. Players bene￿t from
higher output levels, but selecting higher strategies is costly ￿players only want to select a
higher strategy if all other players do so as well. The set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for
the game consists of all outcomes in which players select the same strategy. The incentives
are such that equilibria corresponding to higher e⁄ort choices are more e¢ cient than those
in which players make lower choices and the e¢ cient equilibrium corresponds to all players
selecting strategy K. Our version of the game is augmented by including an element that
leads to the group output being an increasing, concave function of the number of players
in the group. Thus, holding the minimum choice in the group constant, output is greater
when the group is larger. This creates a ceteris paribus e¢ ciency gain from having larger
groups. It is still the case, though, that growth in the size of the group decreases earnings
if it leads to coordination on a lower-output equilibrium.
In our experiment, we divide each group into two endogenously-determined subgroups
￿one ￿high-performing￿small subgroup and one ￿low-performing￿large subgroup. Our
procedure reliably creates small, e¢ ciently-coordinated subgroups and large subgroups co-
ordinated on ine¢ cient levels of output. Earnings in the small groups are higher.
We then allow participants from the Low subgroup to voluntarily move to the High
subgroup. Given our payo⁄ structure, such movement can lead to a Pareto improvement
whereby both incumbents in the High subgroup and entrants from the Low subgroup can
earn higher payo⁄s. But this improvement is only realized if entry does not lead to lower
output levels.
Our subgroups can therefore represent, for example, a large country or ￿rm coordinated
on ine¢ cient practices, and a smaller one that is more successful. Migration from the
large subgroup into the smaller one can make everyone better o⁄, but only if the entrants
adapt their behavior to the actions that have thus far yield e¢ cient coordination in the
smaller subgroup. To our knowledge, ours is the ￿rst experimental design that repeatedly
creates two such subgroups, and then uses them to explore the e⁄ects of movement from
the ine¢ cient group into the e¢ cient one.
Our primary purpose is to explore the relative e⁄ectiveness of alternative mechanisms
3for regulating entry in to the successful subgroup. We consider four treatments, corre-
sponding to varying degrees of entry regulation. In a Baseline treatment, we impose no
restrictions, allowing anyone who wants to move to do so. In a Quiz treatment, there is
no limit on the number of entrants, but all entrants must successfully complete a short
quiz demonstrating both the ability to calculate game payo⁄s and knowledge of historical
outcomes in the High subgroup. In a Quota treatment, only one participant is allowed to
move per period, with multiple requests accepted or declined by a random lottery. Finally,
in a Combined treatment, both restrictions are simultaneously in place. We include the
combined treatment to determine the extent to which there are bene￿ts from employing
multiple policies simultaneously.
Previous research in economics, organizations, and sociology explores the determinants
of successful assimilation of new entrants into entities such as countries, ￿rms, or work teams
(Borjas, 1995; Cable and Judge, 1996; Card, 2005; Chatman and Flynn, 2001; Friedberg,
2001; Ortega, 2005; Rumbaut, 1997). Some of this work explicitly addresses the need for and
e⁄ectiveness of di⁄erent policies to regulate entry. For example, Warne (1921) argued for
the importance of government policies to regulate and ensure the assimilation of immigrants
into U.S. society, noting that, ￿If the volume of total immigration is likely at any time to
become so large as to make ine⁄ective our forces of assimilation, then this volume should be
decreased by restrictive measures; if the elements comprising any particular group or race,
no matter how few in number relatively, are unassimilable into our American life then these
too should be restricted￿(p. 185). More recently, Borjas (1994) discussed how changes to
a points-based scoring system used to evaluate immigrants to Canada signi￿cantly a⁄ected
the educational attainment of admitted immigrants. In an organizational context, Ryan and
Sackett (1987) demonstrated that pre-employment screening can be useful for discriminating
between honest and dishonest employees. O￿Reilly III, Chatman, and Caldwell (1991)
demonstrated that greater correspondence between an individual￿ s characteristics and the
organization￿ s culture yields more successful outcomes in hiring, such as longer employee
retention.
Our work adds to this literature, by employing a laboratory experiment to explore
di⁄erent policies for regulating entry. While the laboratory necessarily sacri￿ces some degree
of generalizability to these real-world contexts, it also allows us to avoid concerns that are
present in the ￿eld. For example, in evaluating the e⁄ectiveness of di⁄erent policies for
regulating entry in real-world groups, the endogenous selection of policies makes inference
about whether outcomes are truly the result of a particular policy di¢ cult. In the laboratory,
however, we can avoid this concern by randomly-assigning groups to di⁄erent policies.
4Our work is more closely related to a small number of experimental studies that explore
alternate methods for determining group composition, and their e⁄ect on e¢ ciency in pro-
duction games. For example, Weber (2006) shows how groups that start of small and grow
can maintain e¢ cient coordination, but only when entrants are exposed to a group￿ s prior
history. However, there are at least two ways in which the experiment in Weber (2006)
leaves open important questions about how to manage the growth of real-world groups.
First, entry in Weber (2006) drew from participants with no prior history of playing the
game. This is unlike many real-world situations, in which entry occurs by drawing from
people from lower-performing environments, where there may be a history of failure or inef-
￿ciency. In our experiment, entry involves incorporating participants with a strong history
of low-e¢ ciency outcomes. This di⁄erence in the prior experience of entrants is important
since it may very well be the case that the slow growth in Weber (2006) proves ine⁄ective
when incorporating entrants from lower-performing groups. The past poor performance
background of these entrants￿groups may make their e¢ cient assimilation more di¢ cult
than when they have no history. Second, Weber (2006) does not consider alternative mech-
anisms for regulating entry, as we do here. Thus, the experiment in Weber (2006) does
not directly address the e⁄ectiveness of entry quizzes or quotas ￿instead, the experiment
primarily serves as a demonstration that slow growth can facilitate e¢ cient coordination in
large groups. Here, we begin to explore the best way in which to achieve this goal. There
are also other di⁄erences between our experiment and Weber￿ s. For example, in Weber
(2006), entry is exogenously determined, according to a growth schedule determined by
the experimenter and which subjects know in advance. In contrast, in our experiment the
movement of subjects across groups takes place more naturally: subjects decide whether
they wish to move to the more e¢ cient group, and then face any entry regulations prior to
successfully doing so.
In other related work, Ahn, Isaac and Salmon (2008, 2009) use a public goods envi-
ronment to explore how endogenous group selection in￿ uences contributions, with players
having the opportunity to enter and exit groups. Their experiments vary the degree to
which both entry and exit from groups are restricted, ￿nding that both restricted entry and
exit signi￿cantly in￿ uence contributions.
2 Experimental Design
In our experiment subjects played a version of a weak-link coordination game over a total
of 25 periods. Earnings from the game were denominated in Experimental Currency Units
5(ECU), which were converted to money at a rate of 60 ECUs=$1.
2.1 The Game
In each period subjects had 7 tokens that they could either keep or contribute to a group
account. We will let xi denote the amount contributed. For every token retained the subject
received 3 ECUs. The total return on the tokens contributed to the group account depended
on the number of players in the group, N; and the minimum of the tokens contributed among
the group (N). Let x￿i represent the vector of contributions of all of the other members of
i￿ s group. Then the total return on the group contribution was 6 ￿ N:25 ￿ min(xi;x￿i): We
will refer to 6 ￿ N:25 as the group account multiplier since it tells us the per token return
for the minimum number of tokens contributed to the group account. Finally, contributing
to the group account cost an individual x1:5
i : The entire payo⁄ function is contained in
equation 1
￿(xi;x￿i) = 3 ￿ (7 ￿ xi) + 6 ￿ N:25 ￿ min(xi;x￿i) ￿ x1:5
i (1)
The properties of this game are standard for weak-link games as described above. For
any group size N ￿ 2; any level of contribution is a Nash equilibrium if all players are
contributing the same amount. All players contributing 7, or the maximum number of
tokens, is the Pareto dominant or e¢ cient equilibrium. To make certain that subjects
would be able to understand the incentives generated by this payo⁄ function we provided
them with multiple payo⁄tables corresponding to di⁄ering values of N and we provided the
ability in the software to calculate prospective earnings by entering a hypothetical minimum
for others as well as an own contribution to see the resulting payo⁄for as many combinations
as they liked prior to making a decision in a period.
2.2 Stages
Each session involved 20 subjects who were split into 2 separate 10-person groups. These
groups were ￿xed for the duration of the session and there was never any interaction across
those groups. The experiment proceeded in three stages.
In Stage 1 which consisted of periods 1-3, all members of a 10-person group played the
weak-link game together. In the instructions for this stage, subjects were given a payo⁄table
corresponding to N = 10 to which they could refer in making their choices.2 At the end
of every period in Stage 1, subjects saw their own contribution, the minimum contribution
2Copies of all instruction scripts are available from authors.
6in the group, the group account multiplier for the group, and their own earnings for the
period.
Stage 2 took place over periods 4-10. At the beginning of period 4, each 10-person group
was split into two sub-groups that we called the ￿High￿and ￿Low￿sub-groups. The High
sub-group consisted of the two members from the 10-person group who had contributed
the most in Stage 1. The Low sub-group consisted of the other 8 who were obviously
the lowest 8 contributors during Stage 1.3 Subjects received additional verbal and written
instructions about the new subgroups, including additional payo⁄ tables corresponding to
values of N = 2 and N = 8. The experiment software told subjects to which group they
were assigned and gave them a complete contribution history of their fellow group members.
The instructions used the labels ￿High￿and ￿Low￿to refer to the sub-groups, and were
also explicit about how the subgroups were determined. Subjects then began Stage 2 of
the experiment, playing the weak-link game with only those in their 2 or 8-person sub-
group. After every period in Stage 2 subjects saw the same information as before about
their own subgroup but they were also given information about what was happening in the
other subgroup including the number of group members, the group account multiplier and
minimum group contribution.
Our expectation was that the High sub-groups would be able to coordinate on a high level
of contributions by the end of Stage 2, while the Low sub-groups would fail to achieve high
coordination and would instead play several periods with low minimum group contributions.
This was necessary in order to set up Stage 3 of the experiment in which we allowed subjects
in the Low sub-group the opportunity to move to the High sub-group. Stage 3 lasted from
period 11 through the ￿nal period, 25. Prior to each period, subjects still in the Low sub-
group were asked if they wished to move to the High sub-group. Moves into the High sub-
group were irreversible and subjects who began in the High sub-group were never allowed
the option of moving into the Low sub-group. We chose this limited ￿ exibility to allow us
to precisely address our main research question of whether successful groups could maintain
their level of e¢ cient coordination during an in￿ ux from the lower performing group. Other
than the ability to transition groups, this stage proceeded the same as in Stage 2 in terms
of the information provided to the subjects at the end of a period.
3Subjects were not told prior to this event that they would be divided in this way so their Stage 1
contributions could not have been made strategically to try to get into the High (or Low) sub-group.
72.3 Treatments
The mechanism underlying the group transitions varied according to our four treatments.
Complete verbal and written instructions were provided to members of both sub-groups
about the group transition mechanism that would be used. This is important, as it meant
that members of the High sub-group knew what restrictions governed entry into their sub-
group. Also, at the beginning of each period, following any movement from the Low sub-
group to the High subgroup, all subjects saw the number of people in each of the two
subgroups and had the opportunity to explore payo⁄s for their current (and possibly new)
group size.
In the ￿rst, Baseline, treatment any subject indicating a desire to move from the Low
sub-group into the High one was allowed to do so. At the beginning of a period, Low
subgroup subjects wishing to move indicated this choice on the computer and were then
moved into the High subgroup. Thus, there were no restrictions on movement from the Low
to High sub-group. The other three treatments involved some degree of restrictions.
In our second, Quota, treatment only one subject was allowed to move from the Low
to High sub-group per period. This was implemented by the software randomly selecting
one subject from among all those expressing a desire to change sub-groups to actually do
so, while the remaining subjects wishing to move were forced to remain in the Low sub-
group. As in the Baseline, at the beginning of a period subjects in the Low subgroup again
indicated whether they wished to move to the other subgroup. On the next screen, they
found out whether they had been able to do so.
In the third, Quiz, treatment subjects had to correctly answer a two question quiz in
order to move between sub-groups. Any subjects expressing an interest in moving and
successfully answering the quiz questions were allowed to move to the High subgroup. One
question asked subjects something about the history of the High subgroup from the prior
period (such as the size of the subgroup or the minimum contribution level). The other
question gave subjects a sample set of contributions and asked them to calculate the payo⁄
for one of the players. We gave subjects extensive instructions on how to do this calculation
and the software pre-calculated for them the group account multiplier, 6 ￿ N:25; as well as
the cost of contributing, x1:5
i , which made the calculation quite straightforward. We also
provided subjects with access to the standard Windows calculator.
The last treatment is the Combined mechanism, as it imposes both a quiz and a quota
restriction. In this treatment all subjects wishing to transition answered the same two kinds
of questions as in the Quiz treatment. But among all those getting both answers correct,
8only one was allowed to move.
We conducted 9 sessions of this experiment for a total of 18 groups and 180 subjects.
Eight of the sessions were conducted at the xs/fs lab at Florida State University with 2
sessions of each treatment or 4 independent 10-person groups per treatment. We also have
one additional session of the Combined treatment which was conducted at the Pittsburgh
Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL) at the University of Pittsburgh. Average
total earnings were $22.03 (including a $10 participation fee) for an experiment lasting 1 to
1.5 hours. The software used for this experiment was programmed in Z-Tree, Fischbacher
(2007).
3 Results
Recall that in our experiment, each 10-person group remained ￿xed for the entire exper-
iment. However, in Stages 2 and 3, the 10-person group consisted of a High and a Low
subgroup of potentially varying size. For simplicity, in the rest of the paper we refer to
these subgroups using the term ￿group,￿and when we use the terms ￿group minimum￿or
￿group size￿we are referring to the subgroups. We explicitly note any instances in which
we are referring to the entire 10-person group.
3.1 Summary Statistics
We begin by ￿rst presenting a series of summary statistics and graphical depictions of
the data, before presenting the formal results through a series of regressions. Table 1
presents a ￿rst look at the data, summarizing two individual-level variables (average overall
contributions and average overall pro￿ts) and two group-level variables (average group size
and average group minimum) for each treatment. The results, are presented separately for
Stage 2 (periods 4-10) and for the last 10 periods from Stage 3 (16-25). The reason to present
the summary statistics from those ranges is that the Stage 2 numbers demonstrate how well
the two kinds of groups perform prior to the experimental treatment, and thus whether our
Stage 2 manipulation did indeed produce di⁄erentially-e¢ cient ￿low￿and ￿high￿groups,
while the last 10 periods of Stage 3 demonstrate the overall e⁄ect of the treatment after
most of the group transitions have taken place.
There are a number of features that are readily apparent in the summarized data. First,
we see that indeed the Low groups fail to coordinate on a good equilibrium in Stage 2
(the average contribution level is generally around 1) while the High groups are able to
coordinate on more e¢ cient equilibria (the average contribution levels are between 4 and
9Contribs Group Min Group Size Pro￿ts
4-10 16-25 4-10 16-25 4-10 16-25 4-10 16-25
Low Baseline 1.8 2.2 1.0 2.4 8 2.2 22.7 25.7
Groups Quota 1.1 3.1 0.5 2.9 8 1.6 21.2 26.2
Quiz 1.2 1.1 0.6 0.9 8 2.2 22.1 23.8
Combined 1.4 0.8 1.0 0.5 8 2.6 24.8 21.8
High Baseline 4.0 0.5 3.6 0.3 2 8.1 25.1 21.7
Groups Quota 4.5 3.0 4.0 2.7 2 9.2 25.8 35.9
Quiz 5.5 3.8 5.0 3.4 2 8.5 26.8 35.4
Combined 4.9 3.4 4.6 3.3 2 7.6 27.5 37.2
Table 1: Summary statistics from Low and High groups by period and treatment.
5). Thus, our Stage 2 group assignment worked as we expected. Second, in Stage 3, most
of the Low group subjects choose to move into the High group, though in every treatment
there are some occasions in which subjects chose to stay in the Low group.
Next, if we look at average contributions and minima in Stage 3 for the High groups we
see that in the Baseline contributions collapse to near 0 on average while in the three treat-
ments with entry restrictions the High groups are generally able to maintain coordination
on more e¢ cient (higher) equilibria, though with perhaps some backsliding relative to their
average contributions in Stage 2. The Low group contributions are not our main focus, but
we interestingly ￿nd that in some of the Low groups the few remaining subjects by periods
16-25 are sometimes able to improve the e¢ ciency of coordination (re￿ ected both in higher
average contributions and group minima, relative to Stage 2). Since our primary interest
is in what happens in the High groups, and particularly in how entry into the High groups
responds to our treatments, we largely ignore contributions and minima in the Low groups
in the remainder of our analysis. Finally we see that subjects￿pro￿ts generally follow the
pattern indicated by the contributions and minima. That is, pro￿ts are better for High
than Low group subjects (except in the Baseline) and pro￿ts for High group subjects are
higher in the three treatment conditions than in the Baseline.
Interestingly, we ￿nd little di⁄erence between the High groups in the three treatments
for periods 16-25 in contributions, minima or earnings. This suggests that the Quota and
Quiz mechanisms generally work equally well, and that there is no substantive gain from
having both mechanisms in place. We explore these di⁄erences more precisely in the next
section.
Figures 1 and 2 examine the time paths of these results, showing the averages of each of
10Figure 1: Averages of individual and group minimum contributions for High groups.
the summary statistics for each period in the High groups and by treatment.4 The trends
displayed in the ￿gures display the same characteristics indicated by the summary statistics.
In the three treatments with restrictions on entry average contributions and minima drop
modestly from Stage 2 to Stage 3, while in the Baseline they start at about the same level
but then collapses to almost zero. The earnings graph in Figure 2 similarly shows the
earnings per period in the three treatments to be well above the earnings per period in the
Baseline
Looking at entry into the High group (￿Group Size￿in Figure 2), we see the time pattern
of how group size evolves. While the Baseline and Quiz result in nearly identical total group
movement in the ￿rst ￿ve periods of Stage 3, the Baseline had a larger growth spurt in the
￿rst period or two, with the growth in the Quiz treatment catching up soon after. The
Quota and Combined treatments not surprisingly lead to slightly slower growth but we
observe convergence to similarly large group sizes in later periods across all treatments.
Figure 3 shows more detail on group movement. The graph presents the average number
of attempted and successful movements between groups, by treatment, for periods in which
at least one move was attempted. This ￿gure shows that, in Period 11, there are approx-
imately the same number of attempted moves in all three treatments as in the Baseline.
In the three treatments with restrictions, many of those initial attempts fail in Period 11,
4We do not provide similar ￿gures for the Low groups to conserve space and again due to the fact that
their behavior following the transition to Stage 3 is not the element of interest.
11Figure 2: Average group size and individual earnings for High groups.
Figure 3: Average attempted and successful moves per period per group with attempted
moves in that period.
12leading there to be substantially fewer successful moves in those treatments than in the
Baseline. After Period 11, while there are more attempted moves in the three treatments
than in the Baseline, there are approximately the same number of successful moves in all
treatments. Therefore, while the treatments limiting movement produce a large di⁄erence
in the number of successful moves in the ￿rst period in which movement is allowed, their
e⁄ect on total movement in subsequent periods is not substantial.
There is, however, a potentially important di⁄erence in movement between the Quiz
treatment and the Quota and Combined treatments. In the latter two, the average number
of successful moves per period is 1 but that is also the maximum and minimum number
of moves as well due to the enforced quota mechanism.5 In the Quiz treatment, however,
we see that the average number of successful moves per group is around 2 for periods
11-13 and since there was no explicit limit on the number of moves allowed in a period
there is also variation in this number, with some groups experiencing perhaps 3-4 successful
moves and other experiencing only 1. This heterogeneity in successful moves could well
lead to di⁄erential behavioral consequences in the Quiz treatment, relative to the Quota
and Combined treatments, as the High groups in the Quiz treatment potentially have to
incorporate a steady in￿ ux of newcomers at a higher rate in those early periods than High
groups in either the Quota or Combined treatment. But as Figures 1 and 2 reveal, the
di⁄erential e⁄ects on outcomes of such faster entry are minimal.
For our ￿rst set of basic statistical results we provide a set of non-parametric Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests on whether group-level averages di⁄er between the treatments and the Base-
line in each phase. The p￿values resulting from these pairwise tests are in Table 2. For
each test, an observation consists of the average contribution (or average group minimum)
over a stage for each group meaning we have four total observations for the Baseline, Quiz
and Quota treatments and six observations for the Combined treatment. Given that we
are aggregating across all periods in a stage for each group, this test represents a very con-
servative test of whether or not there were di⁄erences across treatments. Examining the
results of the tests in Table 2 we see that there are no di⁄erences between either average
contributions or group minimum contributions in Stage 2, i.e. periods 4-10. On the other
hand, in the last 10 periods of Stage 3, periods 16-25, we ￿nd that all of the treatments are
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the Baseline with regard to both overall average contributions
and group minimum. While we have not included the results from the tests, none of the
three treatments are found to be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each other.
5There are instances of groups with 0 moves per period, but the data for this ￿gure excludes those as the
interest is on examining the attempt/success rate of moves and not the attempt rate of moves.
13Average of Individual Contributions Minimum of Group Contributions
Periods 4-10 Periods 16-25 Periods 4-10 Periods 16-25
Quota 0.886 0.057 0.886 0.037
Quiz 0.686 0.029 0.468 0.027
Combined 0.831 0.010 0.669 0.013
Table 2: P-Values from Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests of di⁄erences in distributions of High
group averages between treatments and baseline.
3.2 Contributions and Earnings
For a more detailed regression analysis of treatment e⁄ects on contributions and earnings,
we employ an estimation strategy that allows us to examine the treatment e⁄ects in Stage
3 conditional on behavior in Stage 2. We employ a standard di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences struc-
ture for panel data, in which we specify binary variables for the di⁄erent treatment e⁄ects
activated throughout the sessions, Quota; Quiz and Combin, a binary variable correspond-
ing to Stage 3, S3, and then interactions of those treatment e⁄ects with the Stage 3 dummy.
These interaction terms measure any di⁄erence between behavior after the introduction of
the group transition mechanism treatment has occurred (in Stage 3) but conditioned on the
behavior in that population prior to the treatment being implemented. For the full speci-
￿cation see equation 2. In order to accommodate any subject- or group-level heterogeneity
we use a random e⁄ects panel structure with the random e⁄ect, ci; on the individual or
group level depending on the regression. The regressions at the individual level include
robust standard errors clustered at the subject level but due to the low number of clusters
for the group level regression we will only use robust standard errors. Since our regressions
will be conducted separately for those in High groups and Low groups we want to begin this
analysis after those group identities have been established. Consequently these regressions
do not include data prior to period 4.
yit = ￿0 + ￿1GSi + ￿2Period + ￿3Quota + ￿4Quiz + ￿5Comb+
￿0(LG ￿ S3) + ￿3(LG ￿ S3 ￿ Quota) + ￿4(LG ￿ S3 ￿ Quiz) + ￿5(LG ￿ S3 ￿ Comb)+
￿0(HG ￿ S3) + ￿1(HG ￿ S3 ￿ GSi) + ￿2(HG ￿ S3 ￿ Period)+
￿3(HG ￿ S3 ￿ Quota) + ￿4(HG ￿ S3 ￿ Quiz) + ￿5(HG ￿ S3 ￿ Comb) + ci + "it (2)
Our ￿rst regressions look at individual contributions and earnings using data from each
individual per period as the unit of observation. To allow us to cleanly separate the be-
14havioral treatment e⁄ects among those subjects who were initially in the High group from
those who were initially in the Low group we run separate regressions for both types of sub-
jects. For the subjects initially in the Low groups they have two sets of Stage 3 treatment
variables. One set measures the e⁄ect of being in a particular treatment on behavior while
still in the Low group and the other set measures the behavior while in the High group (if
a move has occurred). Since those initially in the High group are restricted to be only in
that group, they have only one set of Stage 3 interactions. These regressions can be found
in the ￿rst four columns of Table 3.
The key variables for this study are the Stage 3 treatment variables for subjects in
the High groups, ￿3; ￿4 and ￿5. The fundamental question motivating this study is the
degree to which any of the treatment mechanisms facilitates e¢ cient coordination (higher
contributions) in the High group once entry from the Low group is allowed in Stage 3.
Thus, we are interested in how the treatment mechanisms in￿ uence both whether subjects
originally in the Low group make higher contributions once in the High group in Stage
3 and whether subjects originally in the High group make high contributions in Stage 3.
The regressions show results consistent with the summary statistics from the prior section.
By examining the regressions on individual contributions we see that, for those initially
in the Low group who move to the High group in Stage 3, conditional on being in one of
the three treatments their contributions are on average 3.6 units higher than for subjects
who move in the Baseline condition as indicated by the values of ￿3; ￿4 and ￿5. in the
￿rst column. For those initially in the High group, contributions drop by about 1.6 in
the Baseline treatment in Stage 3, ￿0 in the second column, while contributions in the
other three treatments are about 2 units above that, ￿3; ￿4 and ￿5. The overall e⁄ect of
the treatments on contributions in Stage 3 for those initially in the High group can be
calculated by taking a linear combination of the Phase 3 binary variable (which measures
the omitted treatment, Baseline) with the relevant interaction, ￿0 + ￿3;4; or 5. These come
out to be 0.267, 0.566 and 0.338 for the Quota, Quiz and Combined treatments respectively
with none of those total e⁄ects being signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0. Thus, on net, subjects
who begin in the High groups do not drop their contributions once entry takes place in
Stage 3, while they do drop their contributions in the Baseline condition.
The regressions in the third and fourth columns of Table 3 show similar results for
subjects￿earnings. By examining the same coe¢ cients again we see that earnings for those
that began in the Low Group increase substantially when they move to the High group in
the three treatments but not in the Baseline, where they actually decline. For those that
begin in the High groups, their earnings fall substantially in the Baseline treatment during
15Individual Contrib Individual Earnings Group Min
Initially Initially Initially Initially
in Low in High in Low in High High
GroupSize, ￿1 -0.092￿￿ -0.045 0.196 0.714￿￿￿ -0.190￿￿￿
(0.045) (0.056) (0.185) (0.269) (0.043)
Period, ￿2 -0.0384￿￿ -0.113￿￿￿ 0.269￿￿￿ 0.309￿￿￿ >-0.001
(0.019) (0.020) (0.053) (0.106) (0.021)
Quota, ￿3 -0.647￿￿￿ 0.464 -0.643 0.747 0.429
(0.219) (1.060) (1.247) (2.529) (1.160)
Quiz, ￿4 -0.710￿￿￿ 1.411 -1.525 1.654 1.357
(0.232) (0.970) (1.323) (2.347) (1.359)
Combined, ￿5 -0.400￿ 0.869 2.071 2.365 0.988
(0.237) (1.016) (1.334) (2.118) (1.107)
Low Group * Stage 3, ￿0 0.296 0.307
(0.376) (1.503)
LGS3 * Quota, ￿3 -0.165 -1.521
(0.407) (1.577)
LGS3 * Quiz, ￿4 0.270 -2.910￿
(0.468) (1.575)
LGS3 * Combined, ￿5 -0.505 -2.621￿
(0.414) (1.563)
High Group * Stage 3, ￿0 0.405 -1.642￿ -4.942￿￿ -11.80￿￿￿ -2.222￿￿￿
(0.537) (0.953) (2.304) (2.982) (0.451)
HGS3 * GroupSize, ￿1 0.177￿￿ 0.854￿￿￿
(0.071) (0.324)
HGS3 * Period, ￿2 -0.133￿￿￿ -0.398￿￿￿
(0.024) (0.133)
HGS3 * Quota, ￿3 3.690￿￿￿ 1.909￿ 18.01￿￿￿ 12.39￿￿￿ 2.057￿￿￿
(0.415) (1.023) (2.069) (3.035) (0.497)
HGS3 * Quiz, ￿4 3.584￿￿￿ 2.207￿￿ 19.14￿￿￿ 10.01￿￿￿ 1.884￿￿￿
(0.436) (1.097) (1.565) (3.720) (0.588)
HGS3 * Combin, ￿5 3.692￿￿￿ 1.980￿ 16.99￿￿￿ 11.32￿￿￿ 1.857￿￿￿
(0.469) (1.033) (1.829) (3.192) (0.478)
Constant, ￿0 2.813￿￿￿ 4.916￿￿￿ 19.23￿￿￿ 21.50￿￿￿ 3.989￿￿￿
(0.399) (0.906) (2.063) (1.942) (0.990)
Obs (Clusters) 3168 (144) 792 (36) 3168 (144) 792 (36) 396 (18)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Regressions of Individual contributions and earnings as well as Minimum
Contribution by group.
16Stage 3 but again by testing linear combinations of the Baseline e⁄ect with the interactions
we see that earnings do not fall during Stage 3 in the three treatments.
Further evidence regarding the e⁄ectiveness of the treatments can be found in the last
column of Table 3, which presents a similar regression using the minimum contribution in
a group in a period as the unit of observation. We only conduct this regression for the
High groups, since this is our focus. We see that the group minimum drops signi￿cantly
during Stage 3 in the Baseline condition; ￿0 in the last column, while minima in the three
treatments are signi￿cantly above the Baseline, ￿3;4 and 5. Tests on the linear combinations
to identify the total e⁄ect on the group minima for the treatments again show that there is
no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between Stage 2 and Stage 3 for the three treatments.
Another observation from Table 3 is that there again appears to be no di⁄erence be-
tween the three treatment mechanisms. While we will not present all of the relevant test
statistics, in every regression the coe¢ cients for the High group / Stage 3 interactions with
the three treatments are statistically indistinguishable across treatments. That is, the ben-
e￿cial e⁄ects of the three mechanisms are identical for contributions, earnings and minima.
This indicates that either a quiz or quota restriction works equally well, and that combining
the two kinds of entry restrictions yields no discernible additional bene￿ts.
3.3 Responses to Group Transitions
Another way of understanding the behavioral e⁄ects of the group transition mechanisms can
be found in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 shows some summary statistics for average contributions
for one and three periods before and after transitioning groups for subjects originally in
Low groups and average contributions in the one and three periods before and after group
transitions are allowed for those originally in High groups. For the Low group members we
have also included the ￿1 period contributions for only those subjects moving into a High
group in period 11 as this is the ￿rst period in which group movement is allowed. These
statistics provide a ￿ner grained measure regarding how the subjects respond to group
transitions.
For those originally in the Low groups, the average contribution prior to moving is
approximately 1 in all treatments but after group transition it is above 4 in the three
treatments with entry restrictions but only 2-3 in the Baseline. It is important to note
that for those who moved in period 11 the average of the contributions by those subjects
in period 11 was 4.54. So while overall there is a larger increase after moving groups in
the three treatments than in the Baseline this seems mostly due to subjects moving after
17Original Low Group Members Original High Group Members
Before Own Move After Own Move Before Stage 3 Stage 3
1 Period (Periods 10 and 11 Only) 1 Period
Baseline 1.25 (0.69) 3.29 (4.54) 3.75 3.00
Quota 0.77 (0.33) 4.35 (5.67) 4.00 4.13
Quiz 1.21 (0.80) 4.89 (4.80) 6.00 6.25
Combined 1.47 (1.25) 4.22 (5.00) 5.17 4.83
3 Periods 3 Periods
Baseline 1.32 2.34 3.71 2.29
Quota 0.99 4.49 4.08 4.04
Quiz 1.31 4.60 6.08 5.71
Combined 1.38 4.00 4.97 4.64
Table 4: Summary statistics of contributions before and after group transitions.
period 11 in the Baseline treatment having a much lower post-move increase than those who
moved in period 11. This di⁄erence will be key to understanding the treatment di⁄erences
we found above.
For those originally in the High groups we measure behavior before and after group
transitions are allowed, which means we are looking at the last one or three periods of stage
2 versus the ￿rst one or three periods of Stage 3 (period 10 vs 11 and then periods 8-10 vs
11-13). The table shows that for the three treatments there is a small increase or negligible
drop in the periods right after group transitions are allowed but there is a larger initial drop
in the Baseline condition and this drop worsens over the ￿rst 3 periods while that worsening
does not occur in the three treatments. As further evidence, among the 8 incumbents in the
High Groups for the Baseline treatment, 4 of them decreased their contributions between
periods 10 and 11 while only 3 incumbents did so among the 28 total incumbents in the
other three treatments combined. 6 So it appears that those initially in the High Group in
the Baseline drop their contributions as soon as group transitions are allowed while in the
other three treatments contributions are stable. This is particularly interesting due to the
fact that the average contribution among those moving into the High groups in the Baseline
sessions is higher at 4.54 than the period 10 High group contribution average which was
3.75.
Of course there are other elements in the experiments that could be responsible for some
of these contribution di⁄erences. For example, contributions are likely a⁄ected by subjects￿
individual characteristics as well as by the prior period group minimum in the High group
6The breakdown is 1 out of 8 in the Quota treatment, 0 out of 8 in the Quiz treatment and 2 out of 12
in the Combined treatment.
18Contributions After Move / Stage 3 Begins
Original LG Members Original HG Members
1 Period 3 Periods 1 Period 3 Periods
Group Minimum from 0.698￿￿￿ 0.565￿￿￿ 0.830￿￿￿ 1.246￿￿
High Group t ￿ 1 (0.0781) (0.066) (0.0562) (0.511)
Avg of Own Contributions 0.0825 0.354￿￿￿ - -0.529
x Periods Before Move (0.138) (0.116) (0.510)
Stage 1 Average - - 0.511 1.007￿￿￿
(0.331) (0.297)
Quota 0.524 1.755￿￿￿ 1.396￿ 2.581￿￿￿
(0.449) (0.364) (0.700) (0.491)
Quiz 0.844 1.787￿￿￿ 1.874￿￿ 2.839￿￿￿
(0.511) (0.376) (0.826) (0.531)
Combined 0.379 1.311￿￿￿ 0.933 1.794￿￿￿
(0.448) (0.354) (0.666) (0.468)
Constant 0.832￿￿ -0.139 -1.825 -3.801￿￿￿
(0.392) (0.293) (1.353) (1.195)
Observations 114 111 36 36
R2 0.565 0.668 0.890 0.874
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Regressions on behavior before and after group transitions.
into which an entrant is moving. Table 5 reports regressions testing the robustness of the
above observations on how transitions a⁄ect contributions, controlling for those additional
factors. The regressions use as the dependent variable the average of the contributions a
subject made for the one or three periods after a group transition (Low subjects) or after
group transitions are allowed (High subjects). The independent variables are the subject￿ s
own contributions in the previous one or three periods, the minimum in the High Group
from the prior period, as well as the treatment binary variables. For the subjects in the
High groups we have added an additional control which is the average level of contributions
from the 10 person group in Stage 1. This may well be important to the behavior of the
members of the High groups because the observation of what happened at the beginning of
the experiment may have helped to form their expectations of how new members from the
Low group will behave.
For those moving from Low groups into High groups (￿rst two regressions), we see that
the immediate response is the same across all treatments but then diverges in the ￿3 period
regression. When looking only a single period on either side of a move into a High Group, on
19average all movers increase their contributions as a function of the minimum from the target
group in the prior period and there are no di⁄erences across treatments. By looking three
periods on either side though we see substantial di⁄erences between treatments emerge.
The reaction of those subjects originally in the High groups (second group of regressions)
to the possibility of entry is quite interesting. Here we see a negative constant (though
insigni￿cant in the ￿1 period regression) and the treatment variables are all positive and
almost all signi￿cant even in the ￿1 period regression.
The combination of these regressions with the summary statistics presents a clear picture
of what generated the di⁄erences in the outcomes between the Baseline sessions and the
other three. The typical story expected for why coordination might break down in a well
coordinated group once new members are allowed in is that the new members might not
match the prior behavior of the existing members, leading to a degradation of e¢ cient
coordination. This, however, is exactly what we do not see hurting the coordination of
High groups in this experiment. Instead, in the Baseline treatment, where we observe a
signi￿cant decline in coordination after unregulated group movement is allowed, it appears
that the subjects moving from the Low groups to the High groups are actually selecting
contributions that are quite high and even higher than those originally in the High group.
In fact across all treatments it is relatively rare for a new group member in period 11
to be among the lowest contributors in his group. A summary of how often incumbents
versus new entrants are among the minimum contributors in the High Groups in period
11 is shown in Table 6. What we see is that new entrants are generally less likely to be
the minimum contributors in their group than are incumbents. For example, across all the
High Groups in period 11 in all treatments, incumbents selected the minimum choice in
their group more frequently (18 of 36, or 50 percent) than did new entrants (7 of 25, 28
percent). As a result, across all 16 High groups in period 11, the minimum contribution
was determined more often exclusively by an incumbent (9 groups) than either by new
entrants (6 groups) or a combination of both incumbents and new entrants (1 group). This
set of observations, combined with the contribution data presented above, provides strong
evidence that the new group members are not driving contributions down in the Baseline
treatment. Clearly any di⁄erences in the ability of groups to sustain coordination is hard
to attribute to di⁄erences in behavior by those initially in the Low groups, and more the
result of behavior by incumbents in the High groups.
The di⁄erence in outcomes across treatments is apparently due to the di⁄erential re-
sponse among treatments in how members of the High group respond to the advent of group
moves. In the Baseline treatment we observe the High group members responding to the
20Baseline Quota Quiz Combined
Number Incumbents in High Groups 8 8 8 12
Incumbents at Min 2 5 3 8
Number New Entrants in High groups 13 3 5 4
New Entrants at Min 2 2 2 1
Table 6: Frequency of incumbents versus new members being minimum contributor in
High group in period 11.
in￿ ux of new members by decreasing their contributions, perhaps in expectation that one
of the new members will not match the previous group behavior. Even though the new
members do match the prior behavior, the response by the High group members starts
the unraveling of coordination that we previously observed. In the other three treatments,
where there is a mechanism in place to regulate entry, the members of the High group do
not respond to the advent of group moves with this initial drop in contributions, the new
members match the high contributions of the initial members and the groups are able to
sustain e¢ cient coordination.
4 Conclusion
This study explores the e⁄ectiveness of di⁄erent mechanisms for allowing small, e¢ ciently-
coordinated groups to grow successfully by incorporating new group members from lower-
performing groups. We investigated three di⁄erent mechanisms similar to ones commonly
used outside of the laboratory to restrict entry. One was a simple Quota mechanism limiting
the number of entrants in a period. The second was a Quiz through which entrants had
to demonstrate a minimum level of knowledge of the growing group￿ s history and of the
incentive structure in our production environment. Finally, the third was a combination
of the Quota and Quiz mechanisms. The results of the experiment show that any of the
three mechanisms work equally as well in allowing successful growth without a substantial
breakdown in e¢ cient coordination, while our Baseline treatment with no such restrictions
on group entry generated almost complete breakdown in e¢ ciency.
These results demonstrate not only that the small group can grow successfully, as in
Weber (2006), but that the exact mechanism used to limit the in￿ ux of new members may
be less important than the presence of some mechanism. This is a surprising and important
￿nding as it indicates there are ways for a group to grow quickly while maintaining e¢ cient
coordination. While the size of High Groups in the Quiz treatment lagged that of the High
21Groups in the Baseline by a period or so, their growth rates were otherwise quite similar.
Yet the High groups in the Quiz treatment substantially outperformed those in the Baseline.
And there was only a negligible di⁄erence between the success of the High groups in the Quiz
and the other two restricted treatments, even though the High groups in those other two
treatments grew at slower rates. Moreover, in Weber (2006) entry involved incorporating
entrants with no history of playing the game, while here we show that successful growth
can be achieved even when entrants come from groups that have previously faced a total
collapse in coordination.
One might well imagine other reasons that the Quiz mechanism should have performed
better than the Quota mechanism, as anyone who passed the quiz was guaranteed to have a
good understanding of how payo⁄s are generated and to also know the history of successful
coordination in the High group that they were about to join. Not only might this knowledge
make entrants more likely to understand the need to maintain e¢ cient coordination, but it
might also have convinced incumbents in the well-coordinated High group that newcomers
would not degrade their high contributions. Such screening was found to be quite important
in a public goods setting in Ahn, Isaac and Salmon (2008, 2009), in which high contributing
groups were able to maintain their high degree of cooperation only when existing group
members were given the ability to approve or reject incoming members. In our Quota
treatment there was no ability to screen, only a limitation on the numbers allowed to
enter, and yet this mechanism worked equally as well as the Quiz in this coordination game
environment.
The above results indicate a substitutability between limited entry without information
and information without limited entry. When only one person enters the e¢ cient group at a
time, everyone is su¢ ciently secure that the e¢ cient coordination will not be harmed even if
the incumbents do not know much about that person. Similarly, when multiple people enter
but those people have demonstrated relevant knowledge, everyone is similarly su¢ ciently
con￿dent that growth will not harm the e¢ cient coordination. But the combination of
the two mechanisms yields no discernible additional bene￿t. This suggests that as long as
there is some mechanism to ensure that everyone is su¢ ciently con￿dent that entry will not
overwhelm e¢ ciency, growth will be successful. Given that the only di⁄erence in growth
rates occurred in the ￿rst period in which moves were allowed, this suggests that fear of
what will happen with entry in that ￿rst period is critical ￿once groups have learned that
they can grow successfully, they subsequently do so.
Finally, we also learn something interesting about the role of beliefs when looking at the
instances in which growth failed to yield large successful groups. The decay in e¢ ciency in
22the Baseline appears to be driven more by the behavior of incumbents in the High groups
than by the behavior of entrants from the Low groups. That is, in the Baseline treatment
subjects moving from the Low group match the high choices from previous periods in the
High group. But High group incumbents lower their choices when entry occurs with no
regulation. Therefore, the mechanisms in our experiment that regulate entry appear to
work primarily by reassuring the High group incumbents that the new entrants will match
the previous high standards in their group. Combined with the above results, this suggests
that a crucial role for policies intended to help groups manage growth may be in how they
provide such reassurance to existing group members, rather than in their actual ability to
screen or slow down the entry of new ones.
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